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rule of law. Instead Llewellyn and the legal realists supposedly replaced the rule of law with 
the rule of judges, with judicial decisions being based on the prejudices and psychological 
inclinations of individual judges.25 Accordingly, in the views of many of its opponents, Legal 
Realism was essentially amoral in its approach and either dismissed or took no account of the 
traditional democratic and general societal values embodied within the US legal system and 
other legal systems within western societies.26 As will be seen in Section 2.2, however, such 
accusations against Llewellyn himself were essentially misplaced and unjust. 
2.2 Llewellyn's answer 
These attacks led to Llewellyn including, in his Foreword to the 1951 edition of The Bramble 
Bush, a section headed, in a rather dramatic style and emphasised in italics, 'Correcting an 
Error: What these officials do about disputes .... '.27 In that section, Llewellyn states that these 
are 'plainly unhappy words when not more fully developed and at best a very partial statement 
of the whole truth': 
'For it is clear that one office of law is to control officials in some part, and to guide them 
even in places where no thoroughgoing and control is possible, or is desired. And it is 
clear that guidance and control for action and by others than the actor cannot be had 
out of the very action sought to be controlled or guided.'28 (Llewellyn's emphasis) 
This statement has been described as a retraction of the words 'What officials do . . . ' by 
Twining29, Hart30 and Duxbury31 and as having been withdrawn by Postema.32 
However, we argue that Llewellyn did not retract nor withdraw those words although he did 
significantly qualify them in the Foreword to the 1951 edition (as, indeed, he also did in The 
Bramble Bush itself as we describe below). Nevertheless Llewellyn stated that he had let 
those words stand in the 1951 edition as they were both useful and true in so far as: 
'The words pose the problem of reform of institutions and press upon us the external 
problem of the need for personnel careful upright and wise. They signal the possibility 
of differential favouritism and prejudice on the one hand; the possibility, on the other, of 
much good being brought out of an ill-designed and limping machinery of measures.'33 
In Chapter V of The Bramble Bush itself, Llewellyn stated that he needed to backtrack from 
'What officials do ... ' in Chapter I by asserting, as a 'corrected hypothesis' that: 
25 Duxbury has described this portrayal as a 'caricature' and 'popular burlesque' - see Neil Duxbury, Patterns of 
American Jurisprudence (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997), 66-8 (originally published in 1995). 
26 See Purcell , The Crisis of Democratic Theory, Chapter 9, 'Crisis in Jurisprudence' 159. 
27 See Llewellyn, Bramble Bush, 8. 
28 Llewellyn, Bramble Bush, 9. The phrase 'one office of law' may here be taken to mean one role, function or 
purpose of law. 
29 William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement, 2nd edn (New York: Cambridge University Press 
2012) at 149. The second edition, cited here, contains an Afterword by Twining, which provides a re-assessment 
of some aspects of Llewellyn's works as well reviewing academic commentary since the publication of the first 
edition in 1973. 
30 Hart considered the two statements contained in 'What officials do ... ' as extreme in their nature as they 
suggested that the notion of rules controlling courts' decisions was senseless, but considered that Llewellyn had 
'recanted' from this position by his statements which we have set in the preceding paragraph: see HLA Hart, 
'Positivism and the Separation of Law', 71 Harvard Law Review, 593, 616, footnote 40 and the text to which that 
footnote relates. This article formed the beginning of what has become known as the 'Hart-Fuller' debate. Hart did 
not refer to this 'recantation' in Chapter 7 of The Concept of Law when discussing 'rule-sceptism' but did 
subsequently describe Llewellyn as having retracted 'What officials do ... ' although making clear at the same time 
that he considered Llewellyn to be one of the 'serious American jurists' despite his extravagant statements in 'What 
officials do' - see HLA Hart, 'American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and Noble Dream' 
(1977) 11 Georgia Law Review 969, 970 and 974. 
31 Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence, 105
32 Gerald J Postema, Vol 11, Legal Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: The Common Law World, of A Treatise 
of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence (Carolina, Springer Dordrecht, 2016) 83, n 8. 
33 Llewellyn, Bramble Bush, 9. 
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